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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past sixty-five years, courts have struggled with the application of the fifth amendment's Takings Clause1 to laws that regulate
the use of private property. 2 Because the judicial approach has been
confused3 and inconsistent, 4 courts often handled cases on an entirely

*B.S., 1985, J.D. Candidate, University of Florida. The author is a member of the University
of FloridaLaw Review and will be an associate with Gunster, Yoakley, Criser & Stewart, West
Palm Beach, following graduation.
1. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states that: "No person shall be
S.. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment's prohibitions apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Webb's Famous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897).
2. In 1922, Justice Holmes wrote his now famous opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes stated that if a regulation "goes
too far," it could amount to a taking. Id. at 415.
3. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 24.1 (prac. ed. 1986) ("The law governing such claims, though now
voluminous, remains confused and inconclusive."); Stoebuck, Police Power, Taking, and Due
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ad hoc basis 5 with no specific test to define "takings. '6 Early in this
period, the Supreme Court's analysis of regulatory takings cases
adopted two contradictory approaches. 7 Neither of these approaches,
however, has been able to provide a satisfactory resolution to the
takings issue.
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court reached the merits in
only one regulatory takings case. 8 The Court, however, failed to break
new ground and merely stated that there was "no set formula" to
determine whether compensation was constitutionally required for a
government restriction of private property. 9 In fact, the Court's
analysis may have confused matters even more. According to one
commentator the Supreme Court "essentially gave up" trying to resolve the police power takings issue.1°

Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062-63 (1980) ("Mahon begins the era of extreme
confusion about police power takings .. . ."); see also Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the
Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
4. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 75 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) ("the predominant
characteristics of this area of law is a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results");
Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 743 (1985)
("Justice Holmes ... ultimately did the greatest damage to the construction of the due process
and takings clauses by trying to combine them into one concept .. ".. ). See also D. HAGMAN
& J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 3, § 24.1. The authors state that "[w]hile some courts are
willing to award monetary relief under the fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution for regulatory 'takings,' others refuse to interfere with legislative determinations in so chilling a fashion
and will do no more than invalidate the offending regulation." Id.
5. For a recent decision reaffirming the case by case approach, see Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-432 (1982). However, the ad hoc approach is most
clearly described in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
6. See Stoebuck supra note 3, at 1063; Bender, supra note 4, at 771; Sax, supranote 4, at 37.
7. Justice Harlan first attempted to distinguish takings from police power regulations in
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). His approach emphasized traditional legal concepts such
as appropriation of a proprietary interest, physical invasion, and nuisance. This approach stands
for the proposition that a valid exercise of the police power, in the form of a regulation, is not
a taking. Id. at 668-69. In contrast, Justice Holmes' theory in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922), used a case-by case analysis to resolve what he believed to be at the heart
of the matter: a conflict between public need and private loss. Justice Holmes viewed the
difference between a valid exercise of the police power and an unconstitutional taking as a
matter of degree, not a matter of kind, as Justice Harlan had proposed in Mugler. See Bender,
supra note 4, at 768.
8. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9. Id. at 123-24. Rather, the Court noted that the analysis is essentially ad hoc. Id. at 124.
10. See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1068-69. The primary unresolved issues were: (1) When
has a regulation gone "too far"? and (2) Is compensation an appropriate remedy for a regulatory
taking? Until 1987 the Court, citing procedural and ripeness barriers, deferred reaching the
merits of either issue. See infra note 170 (discussing the Supreme Court's avoidance of these
issues).

1987 "TAKINGS" TRIAD

During its 1986-87 term, however, the Supreme Court decided three
cases which addressed important takings and compensation issues."
Perhaps due to the uncertainty in this area of the law and the importance of the land use regulation, these cases received extensive press
coverage. 12 Many press reports heralded the Supreme Court's 1987
land use triad as a revolution in takings jurisprudence. 13 This paper
presents an overview of the Supreme Court's 1987 takings cases and
their impact on land use regulation. The paper begins with an overview
of the development of takings jurisprudence focusing on the two contrasting approaches the Supreme Court developed early in this century. 14 Next, the paper discusses the Court's recent takings cases
through the 1986-87 term. 15 The paper then presents an overview of
the Court's 1987 decisions. 16 Finally, this section discusses the impact
these cases will have on land use regulation.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

A.

The "Noxious Use" Test

Perhaps the most problematic area of takings jurisprudence is the
relationship between a compensable "taking" and a noncompensable
exercise of police power by the state. In the last part of the 19th
century, Justice Harlan addressed this relationship in the landmark
case of Mugler v. Kansas.17 This case became the leading authority
for the theory that regulatory measures are not takings.1
In Mugler, a brewery owner challenged a state law that prohibited
the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors.19 The claimant argued
that his breweries were erected prior to the adoption of the law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors.- The build-

11. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987); and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
12. See Top Court Deals Blow to Limits on Land Use, Chicago Sun Times, June 10, 1987,
at 12; It's Champagne Time at City Attorney's Beach House, L.A. Daily Journal, June 29, 1987,
at 6 (ed. 1); Bad News: Court Chills Zoning Authority, Nation's Cities Weekly, June 15, 1987,
at 1.
13. See Government Reactions: Subdued, Alarmed, Los Angeles Daily Journal, June 29,
1987, at 7 ("it changes the rules of the game"); see also supra note 12.
14. See infra notes 17-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 72-170 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 171-278 and accompanying text.
17. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
18. See Sax, supra note 4, at 38.
19. Mugler, 123 U.S. 623, 653 (1887).
20. Id. at 654, 656-57.
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ings were erected for the purpose of manufacturing beer and were of
little value for other purposes. 21 Thus, the regulation destroyed, or at
least significantly reduced, the value of his property; therefore, it
could not be constitutionally enforced without the payment of compensation. 2 Justice Harlan rejected Mugler's claim 23 and held that because
the regulation was a valid exercise of the police power it did not
amount to a taking.? Justice Harlan stated that the exercise of police
power is distinctly different from the government taking property for
public use.?
26
The Mugler holding can be bifurcated into two separate theories.
First, the regulation was not a taking because it involved no appropriation of the property for the public benefit. The Court reasoned
that the regulation did not "disturb the owner in the control or use
of his property for lawful purposes . . . but is only a declaration by
the state that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is
prejudicial to the public interests."8 This theory is a literal application
of the fifth amendment's language which requires the state to acquire
a proprietary interest in the property before the Court can find a
taking.2
. The second theory looks at the nature of the property owner's
activity rather than at the government's role.- Under this theory,
Justice Harlan distinguished innocent from noxious uses. 31 The government can abate a noxious use without having to provide compensation
no matter how great the losses are to the property owner.3 2 The Court
reasoned that one could not obtain a vested right to inflict injury upon
the public by a noxious use of one's property- 3 Thus, it followed that
the abatement of a nuisance was not a compensable taking because
uses that injure the public were not property.4
21. Id. at 657.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 657-74.
24. Id. at 668-72.
25. Id. at 667-69.
26. See Sax, supra note 4, at 38.
27. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668.
28. Id. at 669.
29. See id. at 668-69. See also Sax, supra note 4, at 38.
30. See Sax, supra note 4, at 39.
31. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
32. Id. Harlan stated "[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be declared a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit." Id.
33. Id. at 669.
34. See Sax, supra note 4, at 39.

1987 "TAKINGS" TRIAD

The Supreme Court followed the Mugler rationale in two subsequent cases.Y In the 1894 case of Lawton v. Steele& the Court,37
again, chose to use a "nuisance" approach to evaluate a takings claim.

The plaintiff brought an action against the State of New York for the
conversion of fifteen hoop and fyke nets. 38 The plaintiffs nets were
taken by agents of New York State's Commission of Fisheries because
they were maintained in state waters in violation of New York stat4
utes. 39 As such, the plaintiffs nets were classified as a public nuisance. 0
Applying the Mugler approach, the Court used a due process
analysis, rather than a takings analysis, to evaluate plaintiffs conversion claim. 41 Lawton established a three part test to evaluate the
42
substantive due process of a state's exercise of its police power.
First, the regulation must have a legitimate public purpose; second,
the means used to achieve this purpose must be reasonably related
to the purpose; and third, the means must not be unduly oppressive
to individuals.43
Once again, in 1915, the Court used the police power rationale
expressed in Mugler and Lawton to analyze an ordinance which reduced the value of a property owner's land from $800,000 to $60,000. 44

35. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting brick-making within
a designated area upheld as valid exercise of state's police power); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133 (1894) (Court upheld power of state agents to seize fishing equipment used in violation of
fishing regulation).
36. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
37. Id. at 136. The Court stated "[t]he extent and limits of what is known as the police
power . . . include everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to justify
the destruction or abatement ...
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance." Id.
38. Id. at 133. The defendants, who were agents of the New York State Commission of
Fisheries, used their authority to enforce game laws and took plaintiffs' fishing nets. The
defendants charged that the plaintiffs' nets were maintained on the state's waters in violation
of state statutes protecting fish and game, and thus the nets became a public nuisance. Id. at
133-34.
39. Id. at 134.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 136.
42. Id. at 137.
43. Id. The Lawton test reads:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Id.
44. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405.
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In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,45 a brick manufacturing plant owner challenged a Los Angeles ordinance that made it unlawful to operate a
brickyard within the city limits. 46 The plant was built outside the city

limits, but as the city grew it surrounded the brickyard. 47 The Court
upheld a regulation that required the closing of the plant as a valid
exercise of the police power to abate a nuisance. " Noting that the
value of plaintiff's property was reduced eighty-five to ninety percent,
the Court reaffirmed its position in Mugler that regulations and takings
are distinctly different and will not be treated in the same way.49 At
this point in the history of takings jurisprudence, the line between
the two forms of government action, which today is ambiguous and
hazy, was very clear to the Court.
B.

The "Too Far"Test

During the early 1920's, the concept of government began to
change.5 The scope of regulation began to expand beyond the mere
abatement of noxious uses of property. 5' As zoning, conservation legislation, and business regulation became more pervasive, the impact of
the police power on private property ownership emerged as a major
problem.5 At this same time, Justice Harlan ended his tenure on the
Court and Justice Holmes assumed a leading position.- As Professor
Sax stated what "was unique and truly original about Holmes' contribution was that he saw the issue not in conceptual or formal terms, but
as a manifestation of social conflict. '"- This conflict was a struggle
between public need and private loss.- In contrast to Justice Harlan,
Justice Holmes did not see a bright line between a taking and an
exercise of the police power.- The Holmes theory is a continuum,
where a regulation may only go so far before it becomes a fifth amend7
ment taking.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

239 U.S. 394 (1915).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405-06.
Id. at 410-14.
Id.
See Sax, supra note 4, at 40.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 41; see also Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1062.

1987 'TAKINGS" TRIAD

In 1922, Justice Holmes wrote the opinion that has become the
seminal eminent domain case: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.5
Pennsylvania Coal appears to be in direct conflict with Mugler, yet
it did not overrule it.59 Pennsylvania's Kohler Act prohibited coal mining that caused certain surface subsidence enumerated in the Act. 6
Although the coal company did not own the surface rights, it did own
the strata of coal under the surface.61 The Act prohibited the coal
company from mining in the area of Mahon's property, thus prohibiting
it from making any use of the layer of coal it owned. 62 The Court held
that the regulation was a taking under the fifth amendment because
it went 'too far."

Holmes then set out his "diminution of value" test for regulatory
takings of property.- 4 He first noted that "government could hardly
go on" if the state was required to pay for every regulation that
diminished the value of private property.s However, Holmes noted
that the fifth amendment Takings Clause imposed limits on the exercise of police power." He stated "[o]ne fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution ...

[when it] reaches

a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an

58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. See Bender, supra note 4, at 771.
60. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393 n.1. The Act prohibited mining within the city
limits in such a way:
as to cause the caving in, collapse, or subsidence of (a) any public building or any
structure customarily used by the public as a place of resort, assemblage, or
amusement, including, but not being limited to, churches, schools, hospitals,
theatres, hotels, and railroad stations; (b) any street, road, bridge, or other public
passageway, dedicated to public use or habitually used by the public; (c) any track,
roadbed, right of way, pipe, conduit, wire, or other facility [used by a public
utility]; (d) any dwelling or other structure used as a human habitation, or any
factory, store, or other industrial or mercantile establishment in which human labor
is employed; and (e) any cemetery or public burial ground.
Id. (quoting the Kohler Act, § 1 C.P.L. 1198 (Pa. May 27, 1921).
61. When the Koher Act was enacted, Pennsylvania recognized three separate estates in
land: (1) a surface estate; (2) a mineral estate; and (3) a support estate. See Rose, supra note
3, at 563. The support estate arose from the miners' duty to support the surface under which
they mined. Id. This duty could be released through agreement with the surface owner. Id.
62. 260 U.S. at 412-13.
63. Id. at 414-15. Holmes stated "[w]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
64. See id. at 415; see also Rose, supra note 3, at 565; Note, Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis: A "Regulatory Taking"?, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 803, 813 (1987).
65. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
66. Id. at 413, 415.
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exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. '67
Thus, the question of whether a regulation goes "too far" is a matter
of degree depending on the particular facts of each case.6
Justice Holmes' "diminution of value" test has been troublesome
from its inception.6 9 The test's basic problem is its failure to provide
future decision-makers with firm guidelines to distinguish a valid police
power from an unconstitutional taking of private property. For example, how much diminution must there be before a taking occurs?
Perhaps even more troublesome is the question regarding what types
of property does the Takings Clause protect?7 Justice Holmes never
made clear what type of property is relevant in the takings decision.71
III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: CASES SINCE

1978

A. Penn Central
The Court's early decisions created confusion and uncertainty in
the area of takings law. 2 In 1978, the Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York7" attempted to resolve this conflict

67. Id. at 413.
68. Id. at 416, 413.
69. Rose, supra note 3, at 566; see Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1063 ("without choosing
between [Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler] it must be said the decision in Pennsylvania Coal
begins the era of extreme confusion about police power takings that still exists.").
70. Rose, supra note 3, at 566.
71. Id. Professor Rose discusses the problem of determining what property should be
considered relevant when computing diminution of value. In PennsylvaniaCoal, Justice Holmes
used the support estate as the relevant property. Thus, the diminution of value was 100%
allowing the Court to easily find a compensable taking. In addition to the support estate,
however, the company also owned the mineral estate. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis
suggested using these two combined estates as the relevant property. This view of property
would have resulted in a much smaller percentage of the company's property being affected by
the Kohler Act; consequently the magnitude of the diminution of value would be greatly reduced.
One final point Professor Rose notes is that there are really no limits on what may be
classified as relevant property. A court could measure the diminution in value against all of a
company's property. Thus, the diminution of value test would be transformed into a deep pocket
rule where those with a great deal of property must suffer large diminution in value to have
a valid takings claim. Id. at 567-68. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
72. Pennsylvania Coal states that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." 260 U.S. at 415. In contrast, Mugler states that "[t]he exercise of the police power
• ..is very different from taking property for public use." 123 U.S. at 669. In sum, Mugler
holds that no exercise of the police power is a taking, while Pennsylvania Coal holds that an
exercise of the police power is a taking if it goes too far. Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1070. See
also supra notes 3 & 4 (citing commentaries on the confusion arising from the conflict between
Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler).
73. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

1987 'TAKINGS" TRIAD

and provide lower courts with clearer guidelines. Some commentators
have viewed this case as a "renaissance of Supreme Court interest in
takings cases" 74 while others feel that "the majority appears to . ..
create a situation of near anarchy." 75 In either event, Penn Central
stands as a landmark case in takings jurisprudence.
In Penn Central, New York City's Landmark Preservation Law76
limited the ability of owners of historic buildings to alter the structure
of their buildings.- The owners of the Grand Central Terminal challenged the Landmark Preservation Law as a taking of property under
the fifth and fourteenth Amendments. 78 Penn Central had leased
airspace above the Grand Central Terminal to UGP Properties to
construct a multi-story office building.m UGP was to pay Penn Central
one million dollars each year during construction and at least three
million dollars each year during the term of the lease2 ° The Landmark
Preservation Law required permission from the Landmarks Preservation Commission prior to any construction.sl The Commission denied
UGP and Penn Central permission to construct the proposed office
building atop the Terminal. 2
In a lengthy opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court affirmed
the New York Court of Appeals decisions that the law did not unconstitutionally take Penn Central's property, nor deprive it of the property without due process. Justice Brennan began his opinion with a
thorough overview of the factors that have shaped the Court's taking
jurisprudence.8 He started by explaining the purpose of the takings
clause with a famous quote from Armstrong v. United States:6 the
"Fifth Amendment's guarantee . .. [is] designed to bar Government

from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all

74. See Bender, supra note 4, at 782.
75. See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1069 (Stoebuck states that "[t]he Supreme Court's
lengthy majority and dissenting opinions in Penn Central compound rather than disentangle
the doctrinal imbroglio over when a taking occurs.").
76. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976).
77. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.

78.

Id.

79. Id. at 116.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 117.
83. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
84. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 121.
85. Id. at 12a-28. Justice Brennan stated "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for
purposes of the fifth amendment has proven to be a problem of considerable difficulty." Id. at 123.

86.

364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."8 7
However, even with this purpose in mind, the Court had been unable
to develop any "set formula" to determine when a compensable taking
had occurred.as The Court noted that each case ultimately depends
"upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."' 9
Acknowledging that each case is essentially an ad hoc, factual inquiry, Justice Brennan identified several factors of particular significance to the Court.9 These factors are: the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant; 91 the extent of interference with "distinct
investment-backed expectations;" 9 the character of the governmental
action; 93 the necessity of the regulation to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose;- and the possibility of an unduly harsh impact on
the owner's use of his property.95 The Court evaluated the Landmark
Law using these criteria and concluded that the law did not effect a
taking.9
Although the Court presented a meticulous review of takings jurisprudence, Penn Central did little to eliminate the confusion in takings
law.- A close look at the Court's reasoning shows that instead of

87. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123 (Brennan, J., quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
88. See 438 U.S. at 124; see also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
89. 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958)).
90. 438 U.S. at 124.
91.
92.

Id. at 124.
Id.

93. Id. The Court noted that a taking would be more readily found with physical invasions
by the government than with regulations that are merely "adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good." Id. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 594,
595 (1962).
94. 438 U.S. at 127. The Court stated that it was implicit in Goldblatt that a regulation
may "constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose." Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-14 (1977); Nectow v. Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 188 (1923)).
95. 438 U.S. at 127.
96. Id. at 129-38.
97. In fact, the Court's conclusion on the takings issue corresponds closely with the due
process standard used to evaluate the legitimacy of a police power exercise found in Mugler.
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Penn Central majority concluded its opinion
with the following statement: "The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion
of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but
also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the terminal site property but
also other properties." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. As one commentator noted "Justice
Holmes' initial blending of the concepts thus came to full bloom in Penn Central." Bender,
supra note 4, at 784.

1987 '?AKINGS" TRIAD

providing a solution to the takings problem, the Court merely laid out
various doctrinal approaches and attempted to harmonize them. 98 Although Penn Central did not resolve the confusion in takings law, it
indicates what the Court may find significant in resolving future takings challenges.
For instance, the Court stated a point that is common to all takings
analyses. A taking is more readily found when the government has
physically encroached on private property than when the government
interference results from "some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the public good." 99 Following
this reasoning, the Court emphasized the deference courts give to
land use regulations that promote the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare.100 Zoning cases are particularly illustrative of this
view. 101 In these cases, the Court has upheld government actions, even
when they prohibit the most beneficial use of property.102 Furthermore,
the Court affirmed its willingness to uphold regulations that prohibit
uses to which property has already been devoted if the restriction is
necessary to effectuate a substantial public purpose. 103
However, in what appears to be a blatant inconsistency, the Court
attempted to soften this position stating that Pennsylvania Coal "is
the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking.'"'1 4 Surpris-

98. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, simply combined the Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal rationales, sometimes straining the reasoning underlying these cases. See, e.g., Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 133, n.30. Justice Brennan tried to reconcile the instant case, which was
not a nuisance case, with past nuisance cases such as Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915), Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), and Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
He stated "[t]hese cases are better understood as resting not on any supported 'noxious' quality
of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related
to the implementation of a policy - not unlike historic preservation - expected to produce a
widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property." 438 U.S. at 133, n.30.
99. 438 U.S. at 124. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
100. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. The Court cited Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), as an example. Nectow was a 1928 zoning case following in the wake of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (the seminal case in zoning law).
101. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
102. Id. at 125. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962) (ordinance
prohibited lands use as sand and gravel pit); Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426
U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976) (challenge to city charter amendment denying property owner a zoning
change).
103. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-27.
104. See id. at 127.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 1

ingly, after citing this proposition, the Court seemed to pull away
from Pennsylvania Coal on two grounds.
First, the Court stated that their land use decisions have "uniformly
rejected the proposition that diminution in property value, standing
alone, can establish a taking." 1°5 Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Court used this case to redefine "property" in the takings
context. The Court stated that, for the purpose of takings jurispru1
dence, it would not "divide a single parcel into discrete segments."'
Rather, the Court focused on "the extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole." °7 This second point is extremely
significant in takings law because by broadening its view of the property to which the "taken" parcel is compared, holders of extensive
property must suffer a greater loss in value to their property to
establish a valid takings claim. °- Penn Central may be, as one author9
noted, "a case in which too much law is worse than not enough."1
The Court's lengthy majority opinion simply failed to accommodate
Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal.110 Thus, after Penn Central, takings
jurisprudence seemed to be no better off than before.
B.

Takings in the 1980's

Two years after Penn Central, the Court seemed ready to decide
an important issue concerning remedies for regulatory takings. In
Agins v. City of Tiburon,", the remedy issue was whether monetary
relief in inverse condemnation actions12 is a constitutionally required

105. Id. at 131. The Court cited Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 367 (1926) (75%
diminution in value caused by zoning law) and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87
1 % diminution in value). 438 U.S. at 131.
106. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
107. Id.
108. See Rose, supra note 3, at 568 (with this new definition of property "the diminution
of value test emerges as a deep pocket rule").
109. See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1069.
110. Id. Mugler stands for the proposition that regulatory measures are exercises of the
state's police power and are distinctly different from compensable takings. Under the Mugler
rationale, a regulation may go too far and become a due process violation. The regulation would
be void but the Mugler Court held that such an exercise of the police power could not be a
compensable taking. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. In contrast, Pennsylvania
Coal did not view takings and police power regulations differently. Rather, Justice Holmes put
the two on a continuum so that regulations that went "too far" become compensable takings.
See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
111. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
112. Id. at 258 n.2. "Inverse condemnation is 'a shorthand description of the manner in
which a landowner receives just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation
proceedings have not been instituted."' Id.
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remedy for excessive regulation of property.113 Citing a procedural
problem," 4 the Court side stepped this issue and instead focused on
5
whether the mere enactment of the regulation constituted a "taking."1
The appellants in Agins owned five acres of undeveloped land in
the City of Tiburon.1 6 Pursuant to a California law requiring all cities
in the state to prepare general plans, Tiburon adopted two ordinances
17
zoning the appellant's property for open space and residential use."
Density restrictions limited development of the property to a maximum
of five single-family residences., Claiming that the ordinances deprived their property of all economic value, the Agins sued the city for
two million dollars in damages for inverse condemnation. " 9
Although the Court skirted the remedy issue, Agins provided a
good summary of the Court's general approach to regulatory takings
in the 1980's. 120 The Court stated that a land use regulation is a taking
only "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests 2' . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land."'2 Justice Powell explained that although there are no precise
rules to determine when property has been taken, each case requires
"a weighing of private and public interests."'- A finding that a taking
has occurred means that the public at large rather than an individual
property owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of the state's
police power in the public interest.'2 As one commentator noted, Agins
"sustained an open-space zoning ordinance merely by reiterating takings buzzwords and not really saying anything interesting or new."',?Justice Powell may have merely "reiterated takings buzzwords"
but in 1981 in his now famous dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. San Diego,'2- Justice Brennan had something new to say. San

113. Id. at 258.
114. Id. at 260. Because the appellants had not submitted a development plan, the Court
found that there was "as yet no concrete controversy." Id.
115. Id. at 260.
116. Id. at 257.
117. Id.

118.

Id.

119. Id. at 258.
120. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Home, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985) (stating
that although the Court has never precisely defined the circumstances under which a regulation
may amount to a taking, "our general approach was summed up in Agins v. City of Tiburon.") Id.
121. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
122. 447 U.S. at 126 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36 (1978)).
123. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
124. Id. at 260.
125. See Bender, supra note 4, at 794.
126. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[V/ol. I

Diego Gas & Electric Company (San Diego Gas) bought 412 acres of
land as a possible site for a nuclear power plant.- Subsequently, the
city rezoned the property from industrial use to agricultural and openspace use.' The city planned to purchase the power company's land
by eminent domain.-' However, a bond issue failed to receive voter
1°
approval and the city stopped all efforts to acquire the property. 3
San Diego Gas sued the city for inverse condemnation claiming that
the city had refused to permit any development and thus, had deprived
13 1
them of any beneficial use of the property.
The trial court found that the city had taken plaintiffs property
and that just compensation was due. l However, on appeal, the case
was finally resolved in the city's favor with a denial of damages for
inverse condemnation.13 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, but the majority of the Court refused to reach the question
of whether money damages are available as a remedy for excessive
regulation of property.- The Court found that the California courts
had failed to reach a final judgment.- Justice Brennan and three
dissenting justices ' 3 took the position that the California courts had
rendered a final judgment.13 7 Thus, in what has become a famous
dissent, Justice Brennan went on to reach the merits of the appellants'

claim. 13
First, the dissent looked at whether a valid exercise of the state's
police power can ever effect a fifth amendment taking. 139The California
courts had held that an exercise of police power, no matter how arbitrary
or excessive, could not constitute a taking within the meaning of the
fifth amendment. 140 Brennan stated that "this holding flatly contradicts

127.

Id. at 624.

128.

Id.

129.

Id.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

625.
625-26.
627.
628.
630-33.
632.

136. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell joined Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion.
Id.at 636.
137. Id. at 636-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan felt that the majority "fundamentally mischaracterizes the holding and judgment of the court of appeal." Id.
138. Id.at 646.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 647. At least one other court shared this view. See Fred F. French Inv. Co.
v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976).
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clear precedents of this Court. ' 141 He noted that "on many other occasions, the Court has recognized in passing the vitality of the general
principle that a regulation can effect a fifth amendment 'taking." '142
Brennan stated further that although the Court uses no set formula,
"taking is a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of
by general propositions."'143 In his view, the Court's precedents required compensation for a regulatory taking if the regulation in question "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or
[if it] denies an owner economically viable use of his land . .. ." -

The Court acknowledged the confusion in this area"45 and stated that
a determination of where a regulation ends and a taking begins involves
as much judicial judgment as logic.146 Finally, Brennan opined that
once the Court determines that a permanent or temporary regulatory
taking has occurred the Constitution demands that the government
pay just compensation for the period beginning on the date the regulation first effected the taking and ending on the date the government
rescinds or otherwise amends the regulation. 147 Brennan's support of
compensation for regulatory takings was a bold concept -

a concept

that continues to be as controversial in 1987 as it was in 1981.
A year later, in another noteworthy decision, Justice Marshall's
18
majority opinion in Loretto v. Teleprompter ManhattanCATV Corp. 4
reestablished a steadfast rule for takings.19 This rule reemphasized
the basic importance of the physical invasion test in determining
whether a regulation results in a compensable taking.- 5 The plaintiff
in Loretto challenged a New York law that required landlords to permit
cable television companies to install equipment on the landlord's rental
property.1 51 The installations involved the connections of directional

141.
142.

San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 647 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 648. Brennan approvingly cited Justice Holmes' opinion in PennsylvaniaCoal

for the proposition that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. (citing 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
143. 450 U.S. at 649 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 647.
145. Id. at 650 n.15. The dissent cited C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976)
stating that the attempt to distinguish a regulation from a taking is one of the most haunting
problems in land-use jurisprudence and that it may be 'the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's
hunt for the quark." 450 U.S. at 650.
146. 450 U.S. at 650 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 653 n.15.

148. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
149. Id. at 426; see also Bender supra note 4, at 798.
150. 458 U.S. at 426.
151. Id. at 419, 421-24.
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taps and a cable less than one-half inch in diameter.12 The plaintiff
filed a class action suit against the cable company for trespass and
alleged that the New York law effected a taking without just compensation.153

Justice Marshall found a taking and concluded that "a permanent
physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve."'- In a familiar line of
reasoning, the Court cited Penn Central for the propositions that no
set formula exists to determine when a taking has occurred and that
in each case the Court must engage in "essentially ad hoc factual
inquiries." ' 5 Although there are several factors to consider in determining if a taking has occurred, the Court in Loretto put special emphasis on the character of the government action.- The Court stated
that when a physical intrusion reaches the point of being a permanent
physical occupation, a taking has occurred. 157 Justice Marshall summed
up this point by saying that in such a case "the character of the
government action not only is an important factor in resolving whether
the action works a taking but also is determinative.",-s
In 1984, the Court decided a case that proved to be a good compliment to the reasoning in Loretto. While Loretto discussed takings in
the context of a physical intrusion, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Corp.-19
provides insight into the Court's reasoning when the government action falls short of acquisition or occupancy. In Ruckelshaus, a federal
statute provided that trade secrets submitted to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) as a condition to registering a pesticide for
public sale would neither be used by the EPA in evaluating registration
applications of other pesticide manufacturers nor be disclosed to the

152. Id. at 422.
153. Id. at 419, 421-24.
154. Id. at 426. Justice Marshall went on to say "[o]ur constitutional history confirms the
rule, recent cases do not question it, and the purposes of the takings clause compel its retention."
Id.
155. Id. at 426.
156. Id. The Court stated that although there is no set formula, "the inquiry is not standardless." Id. Justice Marshall went on to list the three Penn Central factors: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation; (2) the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations;
and (3) the character of the governmental action. Id. At this point, the Court focused exclusively
on the character of governmental interest and took the opportunity to clearly state that a
permanent physical occupation by the government is a taking. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court added "[w]hen faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent
physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking." Id.
159. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).

1987 "TAKINGS" TRIAD

public. 10 An amendment to the statute allowed both the use and dis1 61
closure of data submitted while the earlier statute was in effect.
Concentrating on the degree of governmental interference with a property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, the Court
found the amendment to the statute to be the legal equivalent of
depriving an owner of tangible real property.'r The explicit guarantee
by the government formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed
expectation which was frustrated by the government's disclosure of
trade secret data. 16 The Court went on to say that such a clear conversion of private property to public use constituted a taking.164
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted that the Court
has, on many occasions, wrestled with the question of what constitutes
a "taking."' He stated that "it has never been the rule that only
governmental acquisition or destruction of the property of an individual
constitutes a taking."' A government action that is not an acquisition
of title or an occupancy will amount to a taking if its effects deprive
67
the owner of all or most of his interest in the property. 1
A reasonable conclusion following the Loretto and Ruckelshaus
decisions is that where governmental activity results in a physical
intrusion of private property, it is virtually certain that the Court will
find a taking.- When no physical intrusion occurs, however, it is far
less likely that a taking will be found despite severe restrictions on
the use of the property and significant economic impact.69 Although

these two approaches help to give some insight into the confusion
surrounding takings jurisprudence, the Court has left many unanswered questions. Until the 1987 term, the Court has had a history
of avoiding important takings issues based on procedural grounds.7 °

160. Id. at 992-93.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1013.
163. Id. at 1005-08.
164. Id. at 1016.
165. Id. at 1004.
166. Id. This statement by the Court is a good balance of the Court's prior statement in
Loretto that a permanent physical occupation by the government is a taking. See Loretto, 458
U.S. at 426-41.
167. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1004-05 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
168. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 3, § 24.3 p. 803.
169. Id.
170. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (no final judgment);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (no concrete controversy). In 1985 and again in
1986, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve one of these questions. In both cases,
however, it sidestepped the merits of the cases for procedural reasons. In both MacDonald,
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1987

A. Keystone
Since the Court decided Pennsylvania Coal in 1922, the standard
for determining when, if ever, a government regulation effects a fifth
amendment taking has been confusing and inconsistent.171 In 1987,
the Court seized the opportunity to reevaluate this standard and clarify
some of the confusion surrounding regulatory takings. In Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,172 the Court took a
close look at PennsylvaniaCoal and provided a current standard for
regulatory takings.
In 1966, the state of Pennsylvania enacted the Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act173 which authorizes the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to implement and enforce a
comprehensive program to prevent or minimize subsidence and to
regulate its consequences.14 The Act prohibits mining that causes
subsidence damage to three categories of structures that were in place
on April 17, 1966: (1) public buildings and noncommercial buildings
generally used by the public; (2) dwellings used for human habitation;
and (3) cemeteries.175 Since 1966, the DER applied a formula that
generally required fifty percent of the coal beneath protected structures to remain in place to provide surface support. 76 Section 6 of the
Act authorized the DER to revoke a mining permit if the removal of
coal caused damage to a protected structure or area and the operator
has not, within six months, either repaired the damage, satisfied any
claim for damage, or deposited a sum equal to the reasonable cost of
repair with the DER.' 7
In 1982, an association of coal mine operators and four corporations
involved in mining filed a civil rights action to enjoin the DER from
enforcing the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations.78 The
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S.Ct. 2561 (1986), and Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Court was
confronted with the issue of "whether a monetary remedy in inverse condemnation is constitutionally required in appropriate cases involving regulatory takings." 106 S. Ct. at 2565-66.
Neither of these cases, however, expanded on existing takings law. They merely raised and
then left unanswered longstanding questions in takings jurisprudence.
171. See supra notes 59, 69-71 and accompanying text.
172. 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
173. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1-.21 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
174. Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1237.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1237-38.
177. Id. at 1238.
178. Id.
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complaint alleged (1) that the application of the fifty percent rule and
Section 6 of the Act constituted a taking of their private property
without compensation and (2) that section 6 unconstitutionally impaired
their contractual agreements. '1 The Supreme Court disagreed with
the petitioners and held the Act and its application were constitutional. 1' o
The Court began its analysis in Keystone by distinguishing
Pennsylvania Coal from the case at hand.'," From his review of
Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Stevens cited two propositions that
Holmes found critical in his 1922 decision. First, because the Kohler
Act did not serve public interests such as health or safety, it could
not be sustained as an exercise of police power. 18 Second, the statute
in PennsylvaniaCoal made it commercially impractical to mine certain
coal in the areas affected by the Kohler Act.'83 Justice Stevens
explained that these two factors have formed the basis for our modern
day takings analysis.' 84 Citing Agins and Penn Central, he stated the
rule that a "land use regulation can effect a taking if it 'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests ...or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."'1 5 Public purpose'86 and economic
diminution are two critical concepts in the current takings jurisprudence because they provide the groundwork for the Court's analysis.
The majority opinion began with a discussion of public purpose.81 7
Justice Stevens noted that the state was acting to protect the public
interest in health, the environment and the fiscal integrity of the
area.'1 Then, citing Mugler, the Court reaffirmed its position that the
nature of the state's interest in the regulation is critical in determining
whether a taking has occurred.189 This cite to Mugler and its progeny

179. Id. at 1239.
180. Id. at 1236.
181. Id. at 1242.
182. Id.
183. Id. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
184. Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1242.
185. In its analysis, the Court discussed the police power idea under the heading of "Public
Purpose." Id.

186.

Id.

187. Id.
188. Id. at 1243. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Mugler theory of "state interest" in regulation. Mugler is the extreme case, standing for the
proposition that no exercise of a police power for the public welfare or safety is a taking.
189. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1244. The Court cited several cases that applied the noxious
use rationale. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (including Hadacheck v. Los Angeles,
239 U.S. 394 (1915) and Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
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indicates that the Court is willing to tolerate a great loss of property
value if the state can justify its actions with a significant public purpose
argument. 190
Justice Stevens specifically states that PennsylvaniaCoal did not
overrule the cases following the Mugler line of reasoning. 19, This demonstrates the Court's retention of two seemingly inconsistent
theories1- and the Court's uncertain direction in its analysis of regulatory takings. 193 The Keystone decision, however, appears to support
the Mugler view. The Court stated that it "necessarily requires a
weighing of private and public interests" when a regulatory action is
involved. 194 In the Keystone Court's view, a state's interest in the
public welfare weighs heavily against any single individual's property
interest. 196 As Justice Stevens stated, "the public interest in preventing
activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one, which in
many instances has not required compensation."',
Using several of its earlier decisions, the Court indicated that the
standard for establishing a "taking" where a public interest is involved
is very strict. The Court stated "[t]hese restrictions are 'properly
treated as part of the burden of common citizenship." '197 Citing Mugler
the Court stated that property owners have an obligation to the community to use their land in a way that will not be harmful to the
public; furthermore, "the Takings Clause did not transform [this] principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State asserts
its power to enforce [this obligation].' 198 "While each of us is burdened

190. The Court noted:
Long ago it was recognized that "all property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."
• . . the Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires
compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it.
Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1245-46 (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 1244.
192. See supra note 17-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Mugler (no police power
is a taldng) and the Pennsylvania Coal ("too far" test) rationales).
193. The Court seems to confirm this view with its statement from Goldblatt saying
"[ajlthough a comparison of values before and after a regulatory action is relevant... it is by
no means conclusive." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1245.
194. Id. at 1246.
195. Id. at 1245. The Court noted that "while each of us is burdened somewhat by such
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others." Id.
196. Id. at 1246. See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
126 (1985) ("governmental land-use regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a
'taking' of the affected property.").
197. 107 S. Ct. at 1245 (quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949)).
198. 107 S. Ct. at 1245.
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somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the
restrictions that are placed on others."' 19 This statement indicates the
high standard a property owner must meet after Keystone to establish
a fifth amendment regulatory taking.
Finally, the Court looked at two economic factors. First, the Court
considered the diminution in value of property required for a regulatory taking.20 The diminution of value test requires a court to compare
the reduction in value of the affected property with the property's
remaining value.-, Thus, the judicial definition of "property" becomes
important. 2°2 The significance of Keystone in this regard is that the
Court adopted Penn Central's broad view of property.- Second, the
Court discussed the property owners' investment-backed expectations.20 The Court stated that the petitioners must prove that they
were denied the economically viable use of their land to prevail.25 The
Court found that the petitioners had not come close to satisfying their
burden.206
Keystone's main impact is that it makes it more difficult for property owners to prevail in facial attacks on land use regulations. The
Keystone Court's broad view of property combined with the strict regulatory takings standard makes it especially difficult for land owners
with sizable property holdings to prevail on takings claims. Keystone's
language2°7 indicates the Court will require property owners to demonstrate that a regulation makes it not just difficult but impossible to
make a profitable use of their land." Thus, Keystone represents a
setback for individual property owners in the battle between state
regulations and individual property rights.

199. Id.
200. Id. at 1246.
201. Id. at 1248.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1248. "Takings jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments . . .this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." Id. See also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
204. 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1242. "[T]here is no record in this case to support a finding . . . that the
Subsidence Act makes it impossible for the petitioners to profitably engage in their business
.... Id. (emphasis
.
added).
208. Id. See also Callies, Takings Clause - Take Three, 73 A.B.A. J. 48 (1987).
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First English

The issue of whether monetary relief in inverse condemnation
should be an available remedy for excessive regulation of property
has been a troublesome question for the Supreme Court during this
decade. 3 The Court had not reached the merits of this issue in four
prior attempts. 210 Finally, the Court addressed the merits of the compensation issue in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glen21
dale v. County of Los Angeles. 1
In 1957, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church bought
twenty-one acres of land in a canyon along the banks of the Middle
Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National Forest. 2' 2 The church used
the land for a camp ground, known as "Lutherglen" which served as
a retreat center and recreational area for handicapped children.2 1 3 The
flat portion of the property "contained a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a
caretaker's lodge, an outdoor chapel, and a footbridge across the
creek. ' ' 214 During the summer of 1977 "a forest fire denuded the hills
upstream from Lutherglen, destroying approximately 3,860 acres of
the watershed area and creating a serious flood hazard. '215 Seven
months later a storm dropped eleven inches of rain on the area causing
the creek to overflow. The resulting flood invaded Lutherglen and
26
destroyed its buildings. 1
Because of the flooding problem, the County of Los Angeles in
1979 adopted an interim ordinance which provided that "[a] person
shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure" in the interim flood protection area in Mill Creek Canyon which
included Lutherglen.21 7 About a month later, the church sued claiming
that the county and the flood control district were liable for dangerous
conditions on the upstream properties that contributed to the flooding, 218 that the interim ordinance denied the church all use of

209. See supra notes 111-147 and accompanying text (discussion of two of the Court's more
famous attempts to answer this question).
210. See supra note 170 (discussing the Court's avoidance of takings cases on procedural
grounds).
211. 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
212. Id. at 2381. The Middle Fork is the natural drainage channel for a watershed area
owned by the National Forest Service. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2381-82.
218. Id. at 2382.
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Lutherglen,29 and the flood control district was liable to the church
for inverse condemnation for engaging in cloud seeding during the
storm. 22° The church sought damages for the loss of Lutherglen under
each count. 1 The trial court struck the portions of the complaint that
alleged that the ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen citing the
California Supreme Court's decision in Agins.2 The state appeals
court affirmed the trial court's decision to strike the allegations concerning the ordinance, remanded inverse condemnation claim based
on cloud seeding, and affirmed the dismissal of the rest of the complaint.2 The Supreme Court of California denied review and the
24
church appealed to the United States Supreme Court. ?
The Supreme Court reversed and held for the first time that compensation is an appropriate remedy for regulatory takings.2 5 However,
the Court was quick to point out the extremely narrow limits of its
holding. The Court stated that it did not decided if the ordinance
actually denied the church all use of their property or if the county
may have avoided a compensable taking by establishing that the ordinance was authorized under the state's police power to enact safety
regulations.The fact that the Court felt obliged to begin its analysis with a
limiting statement shows the significance of the policy issues underlying the case. The dissent saw the policy implications as "obvious" and
"far reaching."228 Justice Stevens showed great concern for the impact
of the Court's holding when he stated:
Cautious local officials and land-use planners may avoid
taking any action that might later be challenged and thus

219.

Id.

220. Id. at 2382.
221. Id.
222. Id. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), affd on other
grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the California Supreme Court held that under California law a
landowner may not maintain a inverse condemnation action based on a regulatory takings theory.
24 Cal. 3d at 275-77, 598 P.2d at 29-31. See supra notes 111-128 and accompanying text discussing
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Agins.
223. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2382 n.3.

224.

Id. at 2382-83.

225. Id. at 2383, 2387-89.
226. Id. at 2389. "We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not deal
with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances and the like, which are not before
us." Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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give rise to a damage action. Much important regulation will
never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and safety area
. . [t]he loose cannon the Court fires today is not only
unattached to the Constitution, but also takes aim at a long
line of precedents in the regulatory takings area. It would
be the better part of valor simply to decide the case at hand
instead of igniting the kind of litigation explosion that this
decision will undoubtedly touch off.
A close reading of this case, however, shows that Justice Stevens'
concerns are unwarranted. The Court did not grant money damages
and it did not establish a new standard for regulatory takings. The
Court merely held "that where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action
by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation
for the period during which the taking was effective."
Justice Rehnquist went into some detail to put the Court's decision
in its proper perspective. He stated that absent extraordinary delay,
mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking are "incidents of ownership."31 Additionally, he said that this
opinion does not "abrogate the principle that the decision to exercise
the power of eminent domain is a legislative function, 'for Congress
and Congress alone to determine.' ' '1 2 This statement merely clarifies
the fact that the Court's holding does nothing to abridge the range
of options open to the government once a court determines a taking
has occurred.m The government may still amend or withdraw the
regulation or exercise its power of eminent domain.2
Proving a compensable taking under the First English rationale
will be very difficult because this holding applies only in extreme
cases. An owner must first prove a taking of all use of his property,2
229. Id. at 2439-40 (footnote omitted).
230. Id. at 2329.
231. Id. at 2388. Justice Rehnquist further stated that fluctuations in value resulting from
legislation for or the beginning or completion of a project are also incidents of ownership and
cannot be considered a takings. Id. at 2388.
232. Id. at 2389 (citing Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), quoting from
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
233. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
234. Id. "IT]he government retains the whole range of options already available - amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain."
Id. In addition, the Court's holding does not permit a court, at the request of an individual, to
force the government to exercise its power of eminent domain. Id.
235. Id. "We merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a
taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty
to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective." Id. (emphasis
added).
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a stricter standard than Keystone's "economically viable use" standard.26 Assuming the owner proves that all use of his property has
been taken, the government "might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use
was insulated as part of the state's authority to enact safety regulations. "2 7 Because of the Keystone Court's assurance that Mugler's
reasoning is still operative,8 the government should be able to defend
virtually all of its land use regulations based on some public welfare
theory. The First English Court makes it clear that it limited its
"holding to the facts presented, and of course do[es] not deal with the
quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays
in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances,
and the like."
C.

Nollan

The final, and perhaps most significant, case in the Supreme Court's
1987 takings triad is Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.M
However, a close reading shows that this case does not radically alter
existing takings jurisprudence. The Nollans owned a beachfront lot in
Ventura County, California. 241 They originally leased the property with
an option to buy.- The building on the lot was a small bungalow they
rented to summer vacationers. 2 Over the years the bungalow had
fallen into disrepair and could no longer be rented out. 244
The Nollans' option to buy was conditioned on their promise to
demolish the bungalow and replace it.m In order to do this, they had
to obtain a Coastal development permit from the California Coastal
Commission (Commission). 2 In 1982, the Nollans submitted a permit
application to the Commission in which they proposed to demolish the
bungalow and build a three bedroom, 1,674 square-foot house, in
keeping with the rest of the neighborhood.24 7 The Commission ap-

236. See Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1244. "A land use regulation can effect a taking if it . . .
'denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' Id. at 1242.
237. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
238. Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1244.
239. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
240. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
241. Id. at 3143.
242. Id.
243. Id. The bungalow consisted of 504 square feet of floor space.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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proved their permit conditioned on the Nollans providing the public
lateral access across their property between the mean high tide line
on one side and their seawall on the other.m The condition's objective
was to ensure the preservation of lateral access along the beach from
a park located one-quarter mile north of the property and a public
beach area 1,800 feet south of the property.A9 By 1982, the Commission
had imposed similar deed restrictions on forty-three other new development projects in the area.The Nollans challenged the Commission's condition in county
court.2 1 They argued the Commission could not imposed the condition
absent evidence that their proposed development would have a direct
adverse impact on public beach access.2 2 The court agreed and remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing.The Commission reaffirmed its imposition of the condition. It found
that the house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean and
contribute to the development of a "wall" of houses that would prevent
the public "psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline
exists nearby that they have every right to visit."The Nollans went back to the trial court which again ruled in their
favor.- The court held that the record did not provide an adequate
basis for the alleged direct or accumulative burden on the public access
and the supposed need for the easement.- The Commission then
appealed to the California Court of Appeals.2 7 While the appeal was
pending, the Nollans tore down their bungalow and built the new
house without notifying the Commission. The Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court holding that an indirect relationship between the access and the need to which the project contributed was
sufficient.? + In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeals holding that the building re26
striction was not a valid regulation of land use. 0

248.

Id.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

258.

Id.

259.
260.

Id.
Id. at 3150.

at 3159.
at 3143. The Nollans filed the action in Ventura County Superior Court.
at 3143-42.
at 3142-43.
at 3142.
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According to the Court, an uncompensated conveyance of the easement across the Nollan's property would constitute a taking. 26l The
Court stated the rule that "a land use regulation does not affect a
taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests and does
not den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."' The Commission argued that among the legitimate state interests advanced by
the regulations were protecting the public in overcoming the
"psychological barrier" to the beach the development created.m The
Court presumed, without deciding, that this asserted connection was
so.2 In such a case, the Commission could deny the Nollans their
permit outright provided their new house, alone or together with other
construction, would substantially impede the regulation's purpose. The
denial of the permit, however, could interfere so drastically with the
Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taking. The Court
was simply applying the two part takings test.
Next, the Court stated that "a permit condition that serves the
same legitimate police power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit
should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit
would not constitute a taking."26 For example, assume the Commission
could have exercised its police power to forbid construction of the
house altogether based on the legitimate public purposes the Commission identified. In this case, the Commission's imposition of some condition on the permit, such as a height or a width restriction that
2
furthers these same legitimate public purposes, is constitutional. 6
The Court stated that "[t]he evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition." 2 - The Court summed up by stating that "unless the permit
condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development
ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but
an "out-and-out plan of extortion."' 0

261. Id. at 3145. The issue the Court focused on was whether requiring dedication of the
easement as a condition for development alters this outcome. In this case it did not, but it is
not the direct holding of this case as much as the Court's analysis that is significant.
262. Id. at 3146. See supra notes 90-95, 121-22 and accompanying text.
263. 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 3147-48.
269. Id. at 3148.
270. Id.
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The Nollan Court appears to impose a new, stricter standard on
development conditions. A look back at past cases, however, shows
that with the exception of California this is not true. The Court even
states "[o]ur conclusion on this point is consistent with the approach
taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the
exception of the California state courts."' 1 However, this does not
mean that the Court's Nollan standard is without significance. Nollan
does require that a local government demonstrate some relationship
between the conditions it imposes and the purpose of the development
restrictions.The Nollan dissent vehemently complains that the majority requires "scientific precision" as a standard .2 3 This is simply not true.
The Nollan Court merely requires a nexus between the state's objective in imposing the regulation and the means by which the regulation
accomplishes its objective.27 The stated objective in Nollan was public
beach access. 5 The permit condition requiring lateral access, however,
did nothing to further the stated objective. Thus, it lacked the required
nexus and was unconstitutional.-6 The Court stated "it was quite
impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house."
Traditional dedication and exaction requirements, such as public roads
and parks inside a proposed development, will likely be unaffected by

271. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. The Court follows this statement with a string of more
than 20 cases. Id.
272. The Court stated in clear terms that the standard was "more than a pleading requirement." Id. at 3150.
273. Id. at 3153 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Spoles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388
(1932)).

274. The Court required that the permit condition serve the same governmental purpose
as the development ban. 107 S.Ct. at 3150. The Court provided an excellent analogy that
demonstrates the point. Suppose "a California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but
granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury. While the ban
on shouting fire can be a core exercise of the State's police power to protect the public safety,
and can thus meet even our stringent standards for regulation of speech, adding the unrelated
condition alters the purpose to one which, while it may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain
the ban." Id.
275. Id. at 3147.
276. Id. at 3150.
277. Id. at 3149. The Court went so far as to state "the condition would be constitutional
even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property
for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere." Id.
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the Nollan standard. However, linkage programs that impose dedications and conditions on a development merely because the developer
needs a permit and the public needs an unrelated public project will
probably fail the test. 278
V.

CONCLUSION

For sixty-five years the United States Supreme Court has struggled with the balance between private property rights and local land
use regulations under the fifth amendment. The resulting case law is
often confusing, contradictory, and inconsistent. The Court's ad hoc
approach to "takings" questions left state courts with vague standards
and many unanswered questions. The Supreme Court did not completely clarify this area of the law. Instead, its three recent opinions
provide small but significant insights into the direction of future land
use decisions.
In Keystone, the Court seemed to tighten its standard for a regulatory taking in two ways. First, in order to challenge a land use
regulation on its face, landowners must show that it is impossible to
make profitable use of their land under the restrictions. Second, the
Court adopted Penn Central's broad view of property. Thus, when
considering the impact of a regulation on a particular property owner,
a court may look beyond the affected property and take into account
the landowners' other property holdings. Therefore, an individual may
be required to show a significant loss in order to prevail on a takings
claim.
Property owners can take solace because the Court's two other
decisions counterbalance Keystone's inauspicious holding. FirstEnglish,
at least in theory, allows compensation for temporary takings of private property. This decision, however, is extremely narrow so it will
still be quite difficult for landowners to get money damages for temporary takings. Landowners must prove that a regulation takes all
use of their property. Assuming this is possible, the government may
still avoid having to pay compensation by claiming the restriction was
a part of the state's authority to enact regulations for the public welfare and thus insulated from a takings challenge.
Finally, and most significant, the Court in Nollan required that
the government must demonstrate a nexus between a regulation's
stated objective and the restrictions the regulation imposes. Most

278. See Callies, supra note 208, at 56. But see Quinn, Inclusionary Zoning and Linkage:
Land Use PlanningTechniques in an Age of Scarce Public Resources, 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
21, 37-39 (1987) (discussion of rational nexus test); Huffman & Smith, The Economics of Linkage
Fees, 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45,46-47 (1987) (discussion of economics of rational nexus test).
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traditional dedication and exaction requirements will probably survive
this holding. The Nollan decision, however, requires local governments to carefully consider the link between land use regulations and
the purpose for the restrictions and exactions. The combined effects
of Nollan and FirstEnglish may be problematic for local governments.
For instance, if a local government cannot demonstrate the required
nexus under Nollan, a court may find a taking. Even though the
taking may only be temporary, FirstEnglish requires that compensation be paid to the affected landowner. It is unlikely that all the
requirements of Nollan and First English will be met in any given
case. The possibility of a compensable taking, however, may be enough
to produce a chilling effect on local land use regulation.
The Supreme Court's 1987 triad of land use cases clarifies some
of the questions and provides a more solid framework that state courts
can use to analyze takings claims. These three cases will not revolutionize takings jurisprudence. They are, however, extremely significant to land use regulation. Their impact will be important as attorneys, developers, and local officials test their boundaries.

